The primacy of women and children’s rights has been consistently recognized in our legal landscape. Since the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Law, commonly referred to as the VAWC Act, the law has continuously afforded ample protection and relief to women and their children who suffer several types of violence, be it physical, sexual, psychological, and even economic.[1]
In the landmark case of Garcia vs. Drilon, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the VAWC Act and ruled that there is a substantial distinction necessitating the creation of a special measure in favor of women and their children: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women.[2] The Court added that the VAWC Act shall address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women,[3] and does not serve to be an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law, as asserted by the petitioner in the said case.
Nevertheless, while the offenses under the VAWC Act are committed by any person against a woman or against her child,[4] the Court clarified that the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.[5] Thus, the VAWC Act does not intend to single out men as the only potential violators of the VAWC Act.[6]
Venturing the flipside
Almost ten (10) years after Garcia, the High Tribunal, in the recent case of Randy Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa Sarmiento-Flores and Rosalina Sibal Knutson, made a new pronouncement that the VAWC Act allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to file a petition for protection orders.[7] The ruling in Knutson, which was promulgated in July 2022 under the ponencia of Justice Mario Lopez, effectively demonstrated that the mother of a child can be an offender under the VAWC Act, and therefore, can be enjoined by a temporary protection order (TPO) in committing further acts of violence against her child. While it acknowledged the rationale in Garcia, the Court found it improper to conclude that the law denies a father of remedies under the VAWC Act solely because of his gender or that he is not a "woman victim of violence."[8]
The case arose when Randy Knutson, an American citizen, on behalf of his minor child Rhuby Sibal Knutson, sought the issuance of a TPO against his estranged wife and Rhuby’s mother, Rosalina Sibal Knutson, on account of physical and emotional abuse inflicted against Rhuby.[9]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Taguig, Branch 69, dismissed the petition on the ground that protection and custody orders under the VAWC Act cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child, and that the child's mother cannot be considered as an offender under the law.[10] Citing the ruling in Ocampo vs. Araya-Chua, the RTC explained that the issuance of a protection order is for [the] purpose of preventing further violence committed by an offender (any person who is the husband, former husband, those who had sexual or dating relationship with the woman or with whom she has a common child) against a woman or her child. It does not pertain to a mother who allegedly abused her own child.[11] When Randy moved for reconsideration, the same was likewise denied.
Randy brought the case to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Randy averred that he availed [the] remedies on behalf of his daughter, who is a victim of violence in the hands of her own mother. Furthermore, he maintained that the VAWC Act does not limit the offender to a male person and the legislative intent is to provide all possible protection to children.[12]
Resolving the case in favor of Randy and Rhuby, the Court ratiocinated in this wise:
Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 9262 explicitly allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to file a petition for protection orders. The exact provision was incorporated in Section 12(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9262 and Section 8(b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, or the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children. The statute categorically used the word "parents" which pertains to the father and the mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law speaks in clear language and no explanation is required. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim may apply for protection orders. Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.[13] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).[14]
The Court further distinguished the present case from the factual circumstances in Ocampo. In that case, the TPO, which was found by the Court to be “anomalous,” was issued to direct the wife herself from further committing acts of harassment against the husband which create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of [the husband].[15] In contrast, Randy filed his petition on behalf of their minor daughter Rhuby, the said petition being principally and directly for the protection of the minor child and not the father.[16] Admittedly, Randy also asked for the temporary custody of their daughter because the mother was allegedly unfit.[17]
Interestingly, the Court echoed the doctrine in Garcia where the use of gender-neutral word "person" in Section 3(a) of the VAWC Act signifies that the gender of the offender is not an essential element of the offense. The High Tribunal also explained that while the title of the law uses the conjunction “and,” the penal provisions under Section 5 of the VAWC Act do away with the conjunctive word "and" and used the disjunctive term "or" that signals disassociation or independence.[18] In essence, the Court adopted a liberal approach in interpreting the provisions of the VAWC Act and elucidated on the consequences of a contrary interpretation, viz:
Obviously, the RTC's restrictive interpretation requiring that the mother and her child to be victims of violence before they may be entitled to the remedies of protection and custody orders will frustrate the policy of the law to afford special attention to women and children as usual victims of violence and abuse. The approach will weaken the law and remove from its coverage instances where the mother herself is the abuser of her child. The cramping stance negates not only the plain letters of the law and the clear legislative intent as to who may be offenders but also downgrades the country's avowed international commitment to eliminate all forms of violence against children including those perpetrated by their parents.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Examining the dissents
The majority opinion’s novelty notwithstanding, it is significant to look into the dissents which further explore the legal ramifications of the VAWC Act. Justice Maria Filomena Singh and Justice Alfred Benjamin Caguioa are one in putting emphasis on the legislative history and congressional deliberations on the bills that eventually became the VAWC Act,[20] which reveal the intent of the legislature to limit the application of the law to violence against the child of the abused woman or child under her care, and not extend it to all children subjected to violence and abuse, as the latter case already falls within the ambit of R.A. No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.[21]
Citing Congress deliberations, Justice Caguioa opined that the child which the consolidated bill intends to protect is the child affected by the abusive relationship the woman victim is/was into. It is the child of the woman subjected to violence and abuse, whether the child is her biological or adopted child or a child under her care. As such, the title was revised to include the word "their" beside children and the body of the VAWC Act consistently made reference to the child as "her child." This is to make clear the intent, as agreed and clarified during the bicameral conference committee, that not all children subjected to violence or abuse are covered by the VAWC Act but only the child of the abused woman or violated mother or the child under her care. In this light, the present case unfortunately does not fall within the purview of the law.[22]
For Justice Rodil Zalameda, the VAWC Act should not be construed to cover all kinds of violence committed by any perpetrator. It was enacted to specifically address one form of violence, i.e., gender-based violence committed by women's intimate partners or the fathers of their children. To hold otherwise would be to hark back to the broad coverage of the Anti-[Domestic Violence] Bill, which Congress has deliberately abandoned. Moreover, as pointed out by women's rights advocates, such broad scope may result in the weaponization of the law against women, who are supposedly the primary beneficiaries of the law.[23]
Finally, the dissents shed light on the proper remedies available to Randy that are not under the VAWC Act: a case under R.A. 7610, a petition for habeas corpus, or a petition for custody of minor.
We write this article to provide an overview about the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children (VAWC) Act and the legal remedies therein. Should you need legal assistance on women and children’s rights, please send an email to ryan@romanolaw.ph.
[1] RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act (2004) [2] Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013 [3] Id. [4] Section 3(a), RA [5] Garcia vs. Drilon, supra [6] Id. [7] Knutson vs. Hon. Elisa Sarmiento-Flores, G.R. No. 239215, 22 July 2022 [8] Id. [9] Id. [10] Id. [11] Id. [12] Id. [13] Id. [14] Id. [15] Id, citing Ocampo vs. Araya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, 23 April 2010 [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] Id. [19] Id. [20] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maria Filomena Singh, G.R. No. 239215 [21] Id. [22] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa, G.R. No. 239215 [23] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Rodil Zalameda, G.R. No. 239215