In enforcing criminal laws, our jurisdiction adheres to the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.[1] Such principle has been opined to be “an indispensable coronary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution,”[2] as while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense, as well as the penalty that may be imposed that can be fixed by the legislative body alone.[3]
Proving to be a timeless rule in criminal law, said maxim has once again found applicability in the 2023 case of Peñalosa vs. Ocampo, Jr., where the High Court cleared Jannece Peñalosa (Peñalosa) from a charge stemming from acts not yet punishable at the time of commission.
The case
The dispute arose when private complainant Jose Ocampo Jr. (Ocampo, Jr.) sued Peñalosa for libel. Ocampo averred that Peñalosa’s 2011 Facebook post was defamatory as it made him appear to be “brainless, disrespectful of his deceased father, lazy, a vagabond, a coward, uncircumcised, a beggar and envious person.”[4]
A criminal Information (formal charge) was eventually filed against Peñalosa. However, Peñalosa assailed the Information through a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice (DOJ).[5]
Ruling in favor of Peñalosa, the DOJ ordered the withdrawal of the Information. The DOJ reasoned that when Peñalosa made the Facebook post in 2011, there was still no law penalizing "Internet Libel.”[6]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) where the case was then pending thus resolved to dismiss the case. Adopting the DOJ’s finding, the RTC held that Peñalosa’s acts constitute internet libel which was not yet not criminally punishable at the time they were committed on 03 August 2011. This is because Republic Act (RA) No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (Cybercrime Law) was yet to be enacted at that time.[7]
Aggrieved, Ocampo, Jr. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which overturned the decision of the RTC. The CA ratiocinated that Peñalosa's act of maligning Ocampo, Jr.'s reputation through a Facebook post was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which states that libel shall be punishable "by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means."[8]
The CA likewise interpreted Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law to mean that the libel provision under the RPC covers libelous internet or Facebook posts, being examples of libel by means of writing. The CA thus remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.[9]
The High Court’s ruling
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Senior Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor Leonen juxtaposed the provisions of Article 355 of the RPC and Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law and held that the phrase “similar means” under Article 355 could not have included "online defamation" under the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis. Under the said rule, "where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible to various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.”[10] The Court thus ruled in this wise:
In Article 355, the associated words are "writing," "printing," "lithography," "engraving," "radio," "phonograph," "painting," "theatrical exhibition,'' and "cinematographic exhibition," clearly excluding "computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future" specifically added in Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. If it were true that Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code already includes libel made through computer systems, then Congress had no need to legislate Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, for the latter legal provision will be superfluous. That Congress had to legislate Article 4(c)(4) means that libel done through computer systems, i.e., cyber libel, is an additional means of committing libel, punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.[11]
The Court further held that to make cyber libel punishable under Article 355 of the RPC is to make a penal law effective retroactively but unfavorable to the accused, thereby violating rule on non-retroactivity of penal laws. Hence, an allegedly libelous Facebook post made may only be punished under the Cybercrime Law, not under Article 355 of the RPC.[12]
Applying the foregoing to the case, since the Peñalosa’s Facebook post was made in 2011, a year before the Cybercrime Law was passed, there was no libel punishable under Article 355 of the RPC. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.[13]
Nevertheless, the Court clarified that Ocampo, Jr. is not left without recourse, as he may still institute a civil action for damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code for harm inflicted upon by defamatory falsehoods. The Court likewise stressed that in civil actions, the complainant has full control of the case, unlike in criminal actions such as the present one, where the complainant has to defer to the prosecution.[14]
We write this article to provide an overview of the laws punishing libel and the means of committing the same. Should you need legal assistance in libel cases, please send an email to ryan@romanolaw.ph.
[1] Evangelista vs. People, G.R. Nos. 108135-36, 14 August 2000. [2] Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Fernando in People vs. Cabural, G.R. No. L-34105, 4 February 1983. [3] Id. [4] Peñalosa vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 230299, 26 April 2023 [5] Id. [6] Id. [7] Id. [8] Id. [9] Id. [10] Id. [11] Id. [12] Id. [13] Id. [14] Id.